Atomic restrictions imposed by the Iran nuclear deal 01/08/2019 – Posted in: Daily News
ATOMIC RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL
For: Preliminary & Mains
Topics covered: Iran Nuclear Deal, Why imposed a restriction, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Use of Uranium
News Flash
Parties to Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal are meeting in Vienna.
The meeting is in response to an escalation in tensions between Iran and the West that included confrontations at sea and Tehran’s breaches of the accord.
Some of the key restrictions imposed by the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Uranium Enrichment level
- The deal caps the level of purity to which Iran can enrich uranium hexafluoride, at 3.67%, far below the 90% of weapons-grade.
- The 3.67% cap lasts 15 years.
Enrichment capacity
- Iran has two vast enrichment sites, at Natanz and Fordow.
- The deal allows Iran to continue enrichment at Natanz but with constraints.
- The deal turns Fordow into a “nuclear, physics and technology center” where centrifuges are used for purposes other than enrichment, such as producing stable isotopes.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
- Slashes the number of centrifuges installed in Iran to roughly 6,000 from around 19,000 before the deal
- Only allows Iran to produce enriched uranium with its first-generation IR-1 centrifuges
- Allows Iran to use small numbers of more advanced centrifuges for research, but without accumulating enriched uranium, for 10 years
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
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Uranium Stock
- The deal caps Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium at 300 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched to 3.67% or its equivalent for 15 years.
- Iran produced tonnes before the deal. Any excess enriched uranium was either downblended to the level of natural uranium or shipped out of the country in exchange for natural uranium.
- In 2015 the deal reduced Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%, to less than the amount needed for one weapon from enough for about 10.
Cutting off the Plutonium Track
- Iran was further from being able to produce a weapon with plutonium than with uranium.
- It was building a heavy-water reactor at Arak that could eventually have produced spent fuel from which plutonium could be separated.
More Intrusive Oversight
- Requires Iran to apply the IAEA’s Additional Protocol – which grants the agency wide-ranging inspection powers – and “subsequently seek ratification and entry into force”.
- Grants IAEA inspectors daily access to Natanz and Fordow for 15 years
- The deal’s signatories must vet Iran’s purchases of nuclear or dual-use equipment
- Bans Iran from carrying out a range of activities that could contribute to making a nuclear bomb.
- In some cases, those activities can be carried out with the other signatories’ approval.
Source: US News
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